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Abstract
In this paper, I examine the effect of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(SNAP) work requirement reinstatement on food insecurity outcomes of able-bodied
adults without dependents (ABAWDs). The policy restricts SNAP benefits of ABAWDs
to 3 months in a 36 months period if they are not working or participating in any work
program for at least 20 hours a week. In the aftermath of the 2008 recession, the Amer-
ican Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 waived work requirements nationwide,
and many states reimplemented the work rule at different times beginning in 2011.
I employ a difference-in-differences approach utilizing this cross-state variation in the
reimplementation of the policy. Using rich information on food affordability and food
intake behavior from the Food Security Supplement of the Current Population Survey
(CPS-FSS), I find that promoting work for food assistance improved the overall food
security status of ABAWDs by reducing disruptions in food intake, anxiety over food
affordability and dependency on emergency food receipt. Subsample analyses indicate
that effects are stronger for never married and less educated ABAWDs.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, the resurgence of work requirements in means-tested transfer programs has
attracted the attention of policymakers and researchers alike. This policy makes engagement
in work or work-like activities (such as job training, community service) a requirement for
being eligible to receive welfare benefits. In response to the economic downturn in 2008,
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 relaxed the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) work requirement on able-bodied adults without de-
pendents (ABAWDs) nationwide.1 In subsequent years, the states began to reimpose the
mandatory work restriction along with the recovery of the labor market. The reimplementa-
tion of the SNAP work requirement rule kindled substantial debate over the consequences of
such policy since the objective of the SNAP is to reduce the chances that participants expe-
rience food insecurity and support low-income households in consumption of a nutritionally
adequate diet. This paper contributes to this debate by examining the empirical consequence
of the SNAP work requirement reinstatement on food hardship outcomes of ABAWDs.
As emphasized by the advocates of this policy, the objective of imposing work require-
ments for welfare benefits is to help low-income individuals attain self-sufficiency and reduce
dependency on government assistance. Another rationale for promoting work in welfare as-
sistance is to distribute scarce federal resources effectively. The requirement would screen
out those who do not have actual need of the assistance, and it would free up resources for
those who are truly needy (Falk, McCarty, & Aussenberg, 2014). On the other hand, critics
argue that the work requirement rule would increase institutional complexities as this policy
would give discretion to individual caseworkers in local welfare offices in deciding who is
able to work and who is not. This would lead to inequitable treatment across the welfare
population who are observationally identical (Barth & Greenberg, 1971). Moreover, demon-
strating an average of 20 hours of work per week can be burdensome for SNAP enrollees,
even for people with jobs, especially those working in low-wage shift positions with irregular
schedules. Failure to get all the paperwork done could lead to loss of food assistance. In
a recent paper, Low, Meghir, Pistaferri, and Voena (2018) argued that as a consequence of
work restriction, some welfare beneficiaries might have to switch from a status of “not work-
ing and on welfare” to “not working and not on welfare”. In line with this argument, if some
ABAWDs were denied food assistance and did not find employment, such “negative exit”
1There are two types of work requirement policies in SNAP: one is a general work requirement on most
able bodied adults (in 18-59 age group) unless otherwise exempted, and the other one specifically applies
to ABAWDs (in 18-49 age group). In this paper, I focus on the later work requirement policy, also known
as the “time limit rule”, as failure to meet work requirement restricts benefits for a certain time. For more
details on the general SNAP work requirement policy, see Falk, McCarty, and Aussenberg (2014).
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from SNAP could potentially increase food insecurity among the welfare-leavers (Harris,
2021). However, if recipients meet work requirements by either retaining SNAP eligibility
or by finding employment with much higher earnings such that they become self reliant,
this “positive exit” from SNAP could in fact improve the food security status of ABAWDs.
Understanding the trade off between costs and benefits of the “work for welfare” policies is
the central motivation of this paper.
In this paper, my goal is to quantify the impact of SNAP work requirement reinstatement
on food security outcomes of ABAWDs. “Food security” is defined as access to enough food
by all people at all times for an active, healthy life. SNAP provides low-income households
with an electronic benefit transfer (EBT) card that can be used to spend on approved food
items for at-home consumption at authorized food stores. An important feature of SNAP is
that benefit levels are set in a manner that benefits should be equivalent to cash transfers for
meeting food expenditure needs. Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2009) point out that in-kind
transfer payments for food items may lead recipients to purchase more of the goods being
subsidized. Along similar lines, a recent study by Hastings and Shapiro (2018) finds that
marginal propensity to consume food out of SNAP exceeds that of equivalent cash amount.
Therefore, it is crucial to understand to what extent the reinstatement of mandatory work
restrictions on the provision of food vouchers may have an impact on household resources
to purchase food items. To address this concern, I examine whether and to what extent the
food security of ABAWDs changed following the reimposition of the SNAP work requirement
rule. I also analyze whether the policy has any impact on the available funds to meet food
needs and total spending on food. An adverse effect on adequate food affordability will be
more likely if people lose SNAP eligibility without finding a job.
In order to estimate the causal effect of SNAP work requirement reinstatement on these
outcomes, I use a quasi-experimental approach based on the policy-induced geographic and
temporal variation. I implement a standard difference-in-differences research design where
the treatment is at the state level. This identification requires adopting and non-adopting
states to experience similar changes in outcomes in the absence of the policy. Several exercises
lend support to this identifying assumption. I provide graphical evidence that the outcomes
of the two groups were not diverging prior to the policy reinstatement. In addition, I show
that the inclusion of state-specific linear time trends does not affect my estimates.
For the analysis, I use the Food Security Supplement of the Current Population Survey
(CPS-FSS) for the years 2009-2017. The survey collects information on food access and
adequacy, food spending, and sources of food assistance for the US population annually. In
fact, this data serves as a primary information source for monitoring effective operation of
the Federal nutrition assistance programs (such as SNAP) as well as private food assistance
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programs and other government initiatives aimed at reducing food insecurity (Coleman-
Jensen, Rabbitt, Gregory, & Singh, 2016). Thus, the richness of the questions in the CPS-
FSS is ideal for examining the effect of mandatory work restrictions across different measures
of food insecurity.
The main results of the paper indicate that the reinstatement of the work requirement
rule caused a 1.25 percentage point reduction in SNAP participation and a 1.92 percentage
point decrease in the probability of being food insecure. The results suggest that ABAWDs
are less likely to be food insecure in response to the policy such that they are less worried
about food affordability, less likely to cut their meal size due to lack of funds to spend on
food, and rely less on external food assistance. The utilization of SNAP also decreased
significantly and persistently in response to the policy. I do not find any significant effect on
food spending. However, I find strong evidence of a reduction in the likelihood of running
short of money for food. Collectively, I view these findings as compelling evidence that
the reimposition of the SNAP work requirement rule improved the food security status of
ABAWDs. These findings are robust to a variety of specification checks. I further present
subsample analyses to validate that these estimates are qualitatively similar across different
subsamples. I also perform a placebo exercise showing that the reimplementation of the
work requirement policy does not affect older ABAWDs of age 50-59 who are not the target
of the policy.
This paper contributes to a growing literature that explores how economic conditions
and policies affect SNAP enrollment and food security. Ganong and Liebman (2018) utilize
geographic variation in SNAP policy changes and find that increases in unemployment can
explain about two-thirds of the increment in SNAP enrollment during the Great Recession.
However, their geographic variation approach does not incorporate the nationwide waiver
of time limits for ABAWDs that occurred in the aftermath of the Great Recession. Nord
and Prell (2011) assessed the effect of the ARRA’s expansion of SNAP eligibility for job-
less adults without children on food security of low-income households. My paper extends
this literature by exploring the effect of restoring the SNAP time limits for ABAWDs fol-
lowing the expiration of the expansions introduced by the ARRA. In doing so, my paper
also fits into a broader literature on the effects of work requirement rules, time limits, and
loss of welfare eligibility. A large number of research studies have consistently found that
reinstating ABAWDs time limits reduce SNAP participation. Using individual-level SNAP
administrative data from Virginia, Gray, Leive, Prager, Pukelis, and Zaki (2021) show that
SNAP participation among older ABAWDs reduces by 58% after implementation of a work
requirement. Using a two-way fixed effects model, Ku, Brantley, and Pillai (2019) find that
expansions of work requirements caused about 600000 participants to lose SNAP benefits
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from 2013 to 2017 and caused a reduction of about $2.5 billion in federal SNAP benefits in
2017. Several studies examined the effect of the SNAP work requirement on participation
and labor market outcomes of ABAWDs and found mixed results due to differences in meth-
ods and data (Cuffey, Beatty, & Mykerezi, 2021; Han, 2020; Harris, 2021). Harris (2021)
and Han (2020) utilize data from the American Community Survey (ACS) and employ a
difference-in-differences approach. Han (2020) finds that work exemption does not decrease
employment among ABAWDs and it leads to a reduction in hours of work by older prime-
age workers, whereas Harris (2021) finds that the reimplementation of work requirements
increased employment for ABAWDs. My paper complements this strand of literature by
investigating the effect of restoring SNAP work requirement on food security outcomes of
ABAWDs.
This paper also builds on an existing body of work that studies the relationship between
SNAP benefits and food security. Several studies find evidence that SNAP is associated with
reduced food insecurity or insufficiency (Bartfeld & Dunifon, 2006; DePolt, Moffitt, & Ribar,
2009; Nord & Golla, 2009; Ratcliffe, McKernan, & Zhang, 2011), while other studies have
found that SNAP participation has no statistically significant effect on food insecurity or
insufficiency (Gundersen & Oliveira, 2001).2 My paper advances this literature by studying
how promoting work for food assistance affects the relationship between SNAP participation
and food-related hardship experienced by economically vulnerable child-less adults.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I review the history and
key facts on the reinstatement of the SNAP work requirement on ABAWDs. In section 3, I
describe the data, and I discuss my empirical strategy in section 4. Section 5 presents the
results and discusses in the context of the prior studies. Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional Background
2.1 SNAP Work Requirement Policy
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), originally known as the Food
Stamps program, is one of the largest social safety net programs in the United States.3
In 2019, USDA reported that 13.7 million households were food insecure, and 5.6 million
experienced very low food security, and the program provided an average of $258 in monthly
2For more details on why results produced from an observational empirical analysis might differ from the
theoretical prediction that SNAP participation has a positive effect on food security, see Gregory, Rabbitt,
and Ribar (2015).
3The 2008 Farm Bill changed the name of the program from the “Food Stamps Program” to the “Supple-
mental Nutrition Assistance Program”. I use “SNAP” throughout the paper to refer to the program.
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benefits to 18 million households (Gregory & Todd, 2021). Legislated by Congress in 1964,
the program is designed to increase food purchasing power of the low-income households.
In a recent series of papers, Hoynes, Schanzenbach and co-authors provide a comprehensive
review of the introduction and early expansion of SNAP.4 In comparison to other welfare
programs, SNAP reaches a broad range of economically disadvantaged populations as the
eligibility for receiving SNAP benefits does not generally depend on family structure, age,
health or disability status (Dickert-Conlin, Fitzpatrick, Stacy, & Tiehen, 2021). The basic
eligibility criteria require the household gross income to be 130 or less of the federal poverty
level (FPL) and the household net income to be 100 percent or less of the FPL.5
Since 1996, the program went through a number of changes in terms of basic eligibility
standards and program administration. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Act (PROWRA) of 1996 imposed strong restrictions on SNAP benefits to the able-bodied
adults without dependents (ABAWDs), amended work registration requirements, but ex-
panded assistance to the low-income families with children, particularly to the single-mother-
headed households. In the post-1996-reform period, a sharp decline in SNAP caseload oc-
curred at the same time as increases in employment among single mothers and decreased in
poverty among children (Falk et al., 2014).
In the 2000s, even before the onset of the Great recession of 2008, the household incomes
became relatively stagnant, and the economic conditions of people with low income and low
education deteriorated. States were then authorized to extend SNAP eligibility and increase
program access. Several states removed the federal SNAP asset restriction and increased
the income limit for most lower-income households by adopting “broad-based categorical
eligibility”. The recertification periods were lengthened to reduce the difficulty of continued
program participation of low-income working families. During the 2008 recession, both the
2008 Farm bill and the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) expanded
most of the social safety net programs, including SNAP, in many dimensions. SNAP benefit
levels were raised, and eligibility requirements were relaxed.6
Prior to the 2008 recession, ABAWDs who were not working or participating in any
work program for at least 20 hours a week were subject to a time limit, which restricted
their SNAP benefit receipts to 3 months in a 36 months period. This work requirement
policy is also known as “ABAWD Time limits” as this policy not only makes engagement
in work activity a condition for SNAP eligibility, but it also limits eligibility for benefits
to a specific duration when the work condition is not fulfilled. Under the prevailing law,
4For more details on the effect of SNAP introduction, see (Hoynes & Schanzenbach, 2009, 2012)
5For more details on eligibility criteria for receiving SNAP benefits, see Ganong and Liebman (2018)
6Mulligan (2012) and Ganong and Liebman (2018) documented details of post-2008-recession changes in
SNAP.
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states could get an exemption up to 15 percent of such population or request a waiver in
areas with an unemployment rate over 10 percent. In response to the 2008 recession, the
2009 ARRA waived the time limit nationwide through October 2010 but allowed states to
retain it if they offered work opportunities for people subject to the limit.7 This national
waiver of time limits for ABAWDs increased participation in SNAP by 1.9 million people
by 2011 (Ganong & Liebman, 2018).8 During this period, the states were not required to
request a waiver; however, after the end of the suspension of the work restriction, most states
continued to qualify for statewide or partial waivers.
In addition, the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008 included “Emergency Unem-
ployment Compensation” (EUC) legislation that temporarily expanded unemployment com-
pensation to qualifying jobless workers during periods of high unemployment in the economy.
As the economy began to recover, EUC expired in December 2013. A majority of states qual-
ified for statewide waivers up to January 2016 based on a “trigger notice”. For many states,
the expiration of the EUC program directly translated into the reimplementation of the work
rule. However, despite qualifying for statewide waivers under EUC, some states voluntarily
reimposed the rule based on their political ideologies.9
2.2 State-level Policy Changes
In order to determine if and when states restored the SNAP work requirement on ABAWDs, I
searched news releases and other sources such as the US Department of Agriculture (USDA),
the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP).10
7Delaware never received waiver since 1996 welfare reform. Even when ARRA waived the rule nationwide,
some counties in Colorado, Texas, and South Dakota retained the work requirement. These four states are
always treated in my baseline analysis.
8Using the USDA Quality Control data, Mulligan (2012) estimated that the waiver of ABAWD time
limits increased SNAP enrollment by 2.3 percent.
9For more details on state’s political incentives, see Harris (2021).
10See https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/abawd-waivers for waiver status of states for SNAP work re-
quirement for ABAWDs from FY2015 till FY2018. Note that the USDA reports the timeline of the policy
reinstatement by Fiscal Year (FY), which runs from October 1 to September 30. Since the survey data
follows the calendar year, i.e., from January 1 to December 31, I report the policy reinstatement dates in
terms of the calendar year in Table 1.
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Table 1: List of states that reinstated SNAP Work Requirement on ABAWDs, 2011- 2017
Effective Year









































Notes: Delaware never received waiver since 1996 welfare reform. Some counties in Colorado, Texas
and South Dakota retained the work requirement even when ARRA waived the rule nationwide.
Alaska, California, District of Columbia, Illinois, Louisiana, New Mexico, Nevada received waiver
for the entire period of my analysis. Partial waivers which were shorter than six months are not




Figure 1: Distribution of SNAP Work Requirement Reinstatement Years (2011-2017)
Notes: Figure 1 plots the distribution of years in which states reimposed the SNAP work require-
ments on ABAWDs either partially in some counties or statewide. Source: Author’s calculation based
on data from the USDA Database (https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/abawd-waivers) and the CBPP
Database (https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/states-have-requested-waivers-from
-snaps-time-limit-in-high-unemployment).
Table 1 shows the effective year when respective states reestablished the SNAP work
requirement on ABAWDs either in some counties or in the entire state.1112 I summarize
the evolution of state-level SNAP work requirement policy reimplementation in Figures 1
and 2. Figure 1 plots the distribution of years in which states reimposed the SNAP work
requirements on ABAWDs either partially in some counties or statewide. Figure 2 shows
the geographic variation and the timing of the work rule restoration from 2011 till 2017.13
11I did not report partial waivers which were shorter than six months in Table 1. For instance, Indiana dis-
continued its waiver, which began in October 2014, in July 2015. Wisconsin had a full-year waiver for the fed-
eral fiscal year 2014 but began implementing the time limit statewide in April 2015 at certification for new par-
ticipants and recertification for continuing participants. North Carolina had a waiver from January through
June 2016. New Jersey had a full-year waiver for February 2016 through January 2017 but began implement-
ing time limits statewide in August 2016 at certification for new participants and recertification for continuing
participants. South Carolina was approved for a statewide waiver from January through December 2016 but
discontinued the waiver at the end of March 2016. For more details, see https://www.cbpp.org/research/
food-assistance/states-have-requested-waivers-from-snaps-time-limit-in-high-unemployment.
12West Virginia had a partial waiver in 2011, but it had a statewide waiver from 2012 till 2015, and from
2016 onwards, it has a partial waiver. 2011 waiver is not shown in Table 1.
13For more insight on the geographic variation and the degree of within-state variation of SNAP work
requirement reinstatement dates, see https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/states-have
-requested-waivers-from-snaps-time-limit-in-high-unemployment.
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(a) 2011 (b) 2013
(c) 2014 (d) 2015
(e) 2016 (f) 2017
Figure 2: Geographical Distribution of SNAP Work Requirement Reinstatement, 2011-2017
Notes: Each figure illustrates the geographical variation of the legal changes in a specific year (for example,
panel (a) illustrates changes in year 2011). The states that reimplemented the rule in the specific year are
marked in dark brown, and those in prior years are marked in light brown. The never treated states are
marked in gray in the maps. Source: Author’s illustration based on data from the USDA Database (https://
www.fns.usda.gov/snap/abawd-waivers) and the CBPP Database (https://www.cbpp.org/research/
food-assistance/states-have-requested-waivers-from-snaps-time-limit-in-high-unemployment)
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In the baseline analysis, I consider the treated states to be those 41 states which received
waiver for all counties during the 2008 recession and reinstated the time limit after expiration
of the ARRA. Throughout the main analysis, I assume a state to be treated if it reinstated
the policy either in some states or in the entire state. Moreover, I consider Texas, Delaware,
Colorado, and South Dakota as the always treated states, and Alaska, California, District of
Columbia, Illinois, Louisiana, Nevada, and New Mexico as the never-treated states. I restrict
the time period of the analysis till 2017 since starting from 2018 the federal government
started to implement work requirements for some adult Medicaid enrollees as a condition for
continued Medicaid eligibility or coverage in some states.
3 Data
The main data source for the analysis is the Current Population Survey Food Security
Supplement (CPS-FSS), also known as the December CPS. The CPS is a monthly survey
conducted by the Census Bureau for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The survey collects
information on demographic characteristics, labor market behavior, and welfare programs
participation of about 50,000 households. Since 1995, the Food Security Supplement has
asked the same household a series of questions on food expenditures, food security, and
the use of food assistance programs annually in the month of December. To determine the
household’s food security status, the food security module of the supplement asks a total of
18 questions: 3 questions about food conditions of the entire household, 7 questions about
food security conditions of adults in the household, and 8 questions about food conditions of
children of age 0-17 if they are present in the household. Table 2 summarizes the questions I
used to construct the food security outcome variables for this analysis.14 These questions are
designed to assess a spectrum of food insecurity ranging from stress about the affordability
of basic food needs to disruptions in eating patterns. The households are categorized into
different levels of food insecurity based on their responses to these questions. Households
that affirm 0 to 2 conditions or report no food access problems or limitations are classified
as food secure. Households affirming more than 2 conditions are characterized as having
low or very low food security. For households without children, low food security means
that respondents have affirmed 3–5 conditions in the module; very low food security implies
affirmation of 6 or more items. Households with marginal food security may have had anxiety
over food sufficiency or shortage of funds to afford food items; households with low food
14I do not study the 8 questions indicating food hardship among children. Since the analysis focus on
ABAWDs, the households with minor children are excluded from the main sample. Moreover, Moellman
(2020) shows that food hardships for adults are much higher than those indicating food hardships among
children.
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security generally report reduced nutritional quality, variety, or desirability of diet without
changes in diet or food intake behavior; and households with very low food security generally
report multiple indications of disrupted eating patterns and reduced food intake. For the
baseline analysis, I construct binary food insecurity variables for each of the 10 conditions,
which take value 1 if households report affirmation for that particular condition at some time
during the last 12 months.15
Table 2: CPS-FSS Food Security Questions
1. “We worried whether our food would run out before we got money to buy
more.” Was that often, sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months?
2. “The food that we bought just didn’t last and we didn’t have money to get
more.” Was that often, sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months?
3. “We couldn’t afford to eat balanced meals.” Was that often, sometimes, or
never true for you in the last 12 months?
4. In the last 12 months, did you or other adults in the household ever cut the
size of your meals or skip meals because there wasn’t enough money for food?
(Yes/No)
5. (If yes to question 4) How often did this happen? Almost every month, some
months but not every month, or in only 1 or 2 months?
6. In the last 12 months, did you ever eat less than you felt you should because
there wasn’t enough money for food? (Yes/No)
7. In the last 12 months, were you ever hungry, but didn’t eat, because there
wasn’t enough money for food? (Yes/No)
8. In the last 12 months, did you lose weight because there wasn’t enough money
for food? (Yes/No)
9. In the last 12 months did you or other adults in your household ever not eat for
a whole day because there wasn’t enough money for food? (Yes/No)
10. (If yes to question 9) How often did this happen? Almost every month, some
months but not every month, or in only 1 or 2 months?
Source: CPS-FSS, 2009-2017. Notes: To determine the household’s food security status, the food
security module of the supplement asks total 18 questions: 3 questions about food conditions of
the entire household, 7 questions about food security conditions of adults in the household, and
8 questions about food conditions of children of age 0-17 if they are present in the household. I
do not report the 8 questions on food security status of children in this table as the focus of my
analysis is on adults who are not living with children of age 0-17.
15As pointed out by Schanzenbach, Bauer, and Nantz (2016), it is worth noting that for many households
the difficulty to meet basic food needs could be for temporary periods. Thus, the annual food insecurity
rates do not uncover the extent of the actual food insecurity problem.
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Beyond food security variables which are the focus of the CPS-FSS, the supplement also
asks questions about household food expenditures, such as usual weekly spending on food,
the amount spent on food at restaurants or cafeterias last week, etc. I deflate these food
expenditure variables in terms of 2010 dollars using Personal Consumption Expenditures
Price Index from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED).
I merge the 2009-2017 surveys to form one set of repeated cross-sections. I restrict
the timeframe for the post-policy period to 2017 because, in January 2018, the Centre for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) allowed states to implement work and community
engagement requirements for certain Medicaid enrollees.16 Although this choice of sample
periods reduces available post-treatment periods for my analysis, this eliminates the antici-
patory effects from Medicaid work requirement, which could confound the estimated effects.
Table 3: Sample Selection for the Main Analysis
Observations
Everyone over 18 906,622
exclude if age > 49 482,075
exclude if not in labor force, unable to work 464,250
exclude if living with minor children 254,759
exclude if in armed forces 253,082
exclude if non-citizen 231,647
exclude if registered in school 182,717
exclude if in foster care 182,653
exclude if didn’t respond to food security questions 142,073
Notes: Data from CPS-FSS, 2009-2017.
To identify the ABAWDs who are subject to the policy, I restrict the sample for my
baseline analysis to individuals who belong to the age group 18-49 years, who are not living
with minors in the household, and who are not disabled. One advantage of CPS is that
it provides individuals’ work disability status along with their labor market performance.
Starting in 1981, the March CPS began collecting information on whether the respondents
have any health problems leading to work limitations. I use respondents’ self-reported an-
swers on their disability status to identify the able-bodied individuals. Moreover, I drop
non-citizens, individuals serving in the military, and those who are in foster care. I also
exclude individuals who are enrolled in college or other institutions of higher education as
they are generally not eligible for SNAP benefits. Table 3 describes the sample selection in
16As of July 2019, Indiana is the only state to have implemented a work requirement waiver.
Arkansas, Kentucky, and New Hampshire have had such waivers aside by the courts as a result of
litigation challenging work requirement. For more details on state-level Medicaid work requirement
waiver status, see https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-waiver-tracker-approved
-and-pending-section-1115-waivers-by-state/.
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detail. Further, I check the sensitivity of the main results to additional sample restrictions.
All analyses use the Food Security Supplement weights so that the estimates are nation-
ally representative. The US Census Bureau calculates the survey sample weights to indicate
how many households were represented by each household that responded to the survey. In
order to correct the bias that can result from nonresponse to the supplement by households
that responded to the labor-force questions, the supplement weight considers income and
other relevant information about these households which took part in the labor-force part of
the survey but didn’t respond to food security questions (Coleman-Jensen et al., 2016). In
my sample, the Food Security Supplement weight is zero for the households which did not
respond to food security questions. As a result, when I run the baseline regression, these
zero-weighted observations are dropped. To address this concern, I further exclude food
supplement non-responders from my working sample. After this adjustment, my baseline
regression includes a total of 142,073 annual observations.
Table 4: Summary Statistics: Outcome Variables
Variables Mean Standard Deviation
Program Participation
Received SNAP Benefits 0.073 0.262
Food Insecurity & Affordability
Adult, not food secure 0.216 0.412
Worried about food affordability 0.175 0.279
Couldn’t afford balanced diet 0.145 0.352
Ran out of food or couldn’t afford more 0.142 0.349
Ran short of money for food 0.255 0.436
Received food from food bank 0.044 0.204
Lost weight 0.029 0.167
Food Intake Behavior
Eating less 0.085 0.279
Skip meals 0.085 0.279
Stayed hungry 0.047 0.214
Observations 142,073
Notes: Data from the CPS-FSS, 2009-2017.
Table 4 and 5 present descriptive statistics of SNAP utilization, food security outcome
variables and food spending of the study population. A caveat of the CPS-FSS is that the
program participation rates are systematically underreported (Meyer, Mittag, & George,
2020). As shown in Table 4, more than 20 percent report that they are food insecure, and
around 25 percent report that they ran short of money to afford food, but only 7.3 percent
report that they received SNAP benefits. Despite this limitation, I show in later sections
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that the main findings of the analysis are consistent with prior studies. Table 5 reports that
the mean weekly households spending on food items is $139.68 (in 2010 dollars).
Table 5: Summary Statistics: Food Expenditure Variables
Variables Mean S.D. Observations
Total expenditure on food, last week ($2010) 139.68 105.46 141,006
Usual amount spent on food, last week ($2010) 126.77 83.53 133,388
Amount spent on food at restaurants, last week ($2010) 41.12 50.77 135,039
Notes: Data from the CPS-FSS, 2009-2017.
Table 6: Summary Statistics: Demographic Variables
Variables Mean Standard Deviation
Age Groups
Age 18-24 0.208 0.406
Age 25-29 0.217 0.412
Age 30-34 0.148 0.355
Age 35-39 0.107 0.309
Age 40-44 0.125 0.331







Other Race 0.078 0.268
Education
Less than HS 0.065 0.247
HS Graduate 0.308 0.462
More than HS 0.627 0.484
Marital Status
Married, Spouse Present 0.295 0.456




Never Married/Single 0.563 0.496
Observations 142,073
Notes: Data from the CPS-FSS, 2009-2017.
14
Table 6 reports demographic characteristics of the sample of ABAWDs. In the baseline
sample, approximately 81 percent are white, and 11 percent are black. Around 56 percent of
my sample are never married or single, but around 30 percent are married. These married
households are the ones that do not have children, or the age of the youngest child in these
households is 18 or higher.
In addition, I obtain data on several time-varying state-level characteristics. Ganong and
Liebman (2018) and Dickert-Conlin et al. (2021) show that business cycle fluctuations, state-
level policy expansions, and changes in local unemployment rate explain the trends in SNAP
take-up rate over the past two decades.17 To control for these state-specific effects, I use
annual state unemployment rates (the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment
Statistics, various years), the political affiliation of the state governor (the Council of State
Governments: Knowledge Centre, Book of the States 2017), and state population estimates
(US Census Bureau, Population Estimates, 2017). Finally, I merge the CPS-FSS dataset
with the state labor market and political variables using state identifiers.
4 Empirical Strategy
In this section, I first describe the main empirical strategy before discussing alternative
specifications to address the potential threats to the identification. By exploiting the within-
state variation in the work requirement reinstatement between 2009 and 2017, I empirically
investigate the effects on the food insecurity outcomes of non-elderly non-disabled adults
who are not living with minor children. Intuitively, I compare the within-state changes in
food insecurity outcomes of ABAWDs residing in states where the SNAP work requirement
was restored partially or statewide to within-state changes in food insecurity outcomes of
ABAWDs residing in states where the work requirement was waived during the period of
analysis.
I employ a difference-in-differences specification by estimating the following regression
model:
yist = α + βPolicyst + λs + ηt + γXit + τZst + ǫist (1)
where yist is the outcome variable for an individual i living in state s in year t. The
treatment variable Policyst is an indicator variable equal to one if state s has reimplemented
the SNAP work requirement partially or statewide in year t. Vectors of parameters are
included to control for state fixed effects (λ) and year fixed effects (η). The state fixed effects
17Ganong and Liebman (2018) further points out that state eligibility for ABAWD time limit waivers
expands and shrinks with the unemployment rate. In that sense, these waivers play the role of conventional
automatic stabilizers, although state interventions are required for these waivers to be effective.
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account for any systematic differences across states and the year fixed effects to control for
shocks to outcome variables that are common to all states in a year. Individual characteristics
are contained in Xit, which includes dummies for age groups, sex, race, marital status, and
education. Zst includes state-specific time-variant controls. Specifically, I use state-year
unemployment rates in order to distinguish the effect of the policy from the lingering effects
of the recession and other economic conditions. I control for the political affiliation of
state governor as some states, based on their political ideology rather than state finances,
voluntarily reimposed work requirements in spite of being qualified for a statewide waiver
under EUC.18 I also control for state population estimates to control for inter-state mobility
in response to the policy. ǫist represents the error term. The coefficient of interest that
captures the average causal effect of work requirement reinstatement is β. As in Hoynes and
Schanzenbach (2009), I will interpret β as an intention-to-treat (ITT) effect. As suggested
by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004), the standard errors are robust and clustered
at the state level to allow for shocks to be correlated within state over time.
The key identifying assumption of the difference-in-differences specification is that the
change in the outcome of interest before and after the policy reinstatement would have been
the same for both the treatment and the control groups in the absence of the policy. To test
this assumption of parallel trends, I look for graphical evidence of whether the two groups
diverged prior to the treatment using the event study approach. In particular, I obtain the
coefficient estimates from the following equation:
yist = α +
4∑
j=−4
πj1(θst = j) + λs + ηt + γXit + τZst + ǫist (2)
where θst denotes the year relative to the reinstatement of the SNAP work requirement
in state s, and the coefficient πj captures the effect of work requirement restoration on the
outcome variable at j years passage. In the year of policy enactment, j is zero, and π0
captures the immediate effect of treatment. In order to satisfy the identifying assumption,
πj coefficients associated with pre-reform time periods should equal zero such that the control
and the treatment groups were on the same trajectory before treatment. I include lagged
indicator variables for each of the first 4 years after reinstatement. These lagged indicators
allow us to check for delayed effects of the policy. The estimated effects are interpreted
relative to the year prior to the reimposition of the work requirement rule as I measure the
coefficients relative to the omitted dummy variable (θst = −1).
In order to check that the food insecurity outcomes are not spurious, I run a battery of
18As of 2017, 14 states voluntarily reimposed the ABAWD time limits while they were qualified for
statewide waiver (Harris, 2021).
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robustness checks which assure that my research design is reasonable. To the extent that
the estimates remain unaffected, it confirms that the estimates I obtained are not biased.
5 Results
5.1 Main Results
In this section, I present evidence on the short-run effects of SNAP work requirement rein-
statement on food security outcomes of the ABAWDs. I begin by estimating Eq. (1) on the
full sample of ABAWDs, and report the estimated coefficients of Policyst dummy in Table 7.
Panel A of Table 7 shows that welfare dependency has decreased as a direct consequence of
SNAP work requirement reimposition. The policy caused a reduction in the probability of
being on food stamps by 1.25 percentage points (pp.). Even though CPS-FSS suffers from
under-reporting of SNAP participation, this estimate is consistent with findings based on
larger datasets such as the American Community Survey (ACS). For instance, using data
from the ACS, Harris (2021) shows ABAWDs have a 1.9 pp. lower probability of claiming
SNAP benefits after the work requirement reinstatement.
Panel B of Table 7 reports the corresponding impact on food security outcomes of the
ABAWDs. The probability of being food insecure reduces by 1.92 pp. Overall, in the post-
policy period, the prevalence of food insecurity reduced among ABAWDs. ABAWDs are less
likely to reduce food intake or make any adverse change in their diets due to a lack of funds
for food purchases. On average, they have less chance of receiving emergency food from
external sources (such as food banks), and they are less likely to be anxious about affording
food items. I do not find any significant effect on the likelihood of staying hungry, not being
able to afford a balanced diet and losing weight due to lack of resources to meet food needs.
The signs of the coefficients are, however, consistent with other food security outcomes.
Next, I turn to the estimates corresponding to spending on food in Table 8. All point
estimates are statistically insignificant and imprecise. CPS-FSS may not be the best data to
analyze the effect on food expenditure as it collects weekly food expenditure only once every
year. This data could be subject to “recall bias”. Panel datasets such as the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) would be ideal as
they contain richer information on food expenditure.
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Table 7: Impact on SNAP Utilization and Food Security Outcomes
(1)
A: SNAP Utilization
Received Food stamps -0.0125∗∗∗
(0.0038)
B: Food Security Outcomes








Worried about food affordability -0.0188∗∗∗
(0.0040)
Ran out of food or couldn’t afford more -0.0158∗∗∗
(0.0045)
Ran short of money for food -0.0143∗∗
(0.0057)
Received food from food bank -0.0068∗∗
(0.0029)






State Specific Controls yes
State FE yes
Year FE yes
Notes: Data from the CPS-FSS, 2009-2017. Sample of individuals age 18-49 who are
not disabled and do not live with minor children. Each parameter is from a separate
regression. Demographic controls include dummies for age groups, marital status, sex,
education, and race. State-specific time-varying controls are annual state unemploy-
ment rates, political affiliation of the state governor, and state population estimates.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the state level. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 8: Impact on Food Expenditure
(1)
Total expenditure on food last week -1.358
(1.692)
[141,006]
Usual amount spent on food per week -0.866
(1.392)
[133,388]




State Specific Controls yes
State FE yes
Year FE yes
Notes: Data from the CPS-FSS, 2009-2017. Sample of individuals age 18-49
who are not disabled and do not live with minor children. Each parameter
is from a separate regression. Demographic controls include dummies for
age groups, marital status, sex, education and race. State-specific time-
varying controls are annual state unemployment rates, political affiliation of
the state governor, and state population estimates. Robust standard errors
are in parentheses, clustered at the state level. Number of observations are
reported in square brackets. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
5.2 Event Study Results
In this section, I conduct an event study analysis to directly examine the timing of shifts
in food security outcomes of ABAWDs relative to SNAP work requirement reinstatement.
Figure 3 plots the estimated lags and leads from Eq. (2), with 95% confidence interval bands
in dotted lines. The post-treatment effects are measured relative to θ = −1 , meaning
that the effects are expected to begin in period zero. This graphical analysis tests for the
divergence in trends between treatment and control groups prior to the policy reinstatement.
The coefficients for the pre-treatment period are close to zero, and the 95% confidence interval
bands contain zero in the pre-treatment periods. This indicates there are no systematic
differences in state trends prior to the policy change. This lends some support for the
validity of my identification strategy.
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(a) Adult Food Insecurity (b) Worried about Food Availability
(c) Run Short of Food (d) Food Affordability
(e) Emergency Food Receipt from Food Bank (f) Received SNAP Benefits
Figure 3: Dynamic Effects of SNAP Work Requirement Reinstatement
Notes: Each figure plots the coefficients and their 95% confidence intervals from an event study analysis.
Coefficients are defined as years relative to years the SNAP work requirement is reinstated in the state. The
specifications includes demographic controls, time-varying state-specific controls, fixed effects for state and
year.
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(a) Adult Food Insecurity (b) Worried about Food Availability
(c) Run Short of Food (d) Food Affordability
(e) Emergency Food Receipt from Food Bank (f) Received SNAP Benefits
Figure 4: Event Study Analysis with State-Specific Linear Time Trends
Notes: Each figure plots the coefficients and their 95% confidence intervals from an event study analysis.
Coefficients are defined as years relative to years the SNAP work requirement is reinstated in the state. The
specifications includes demographic controls, time-varying state-specific controls, state-specific linear time
trends, fixed effects for state and year.
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The event study analysis also allows to examine dynamics of policy effects. The graphs
indicate that there is a striking change in the relative outcome of the treatment and the
comparison groups after the reform. ABAWDs in the treated states are less likely to face
food hardships due to lack of resources in the post-treatment periods. Although the graphs
show effects are attenuated around 2 or more years after policy change, this could be due
to the lack of post-treatment data for most of the treated states. Overall, the food security
outcomes improve temporarily in response to the policy.
Further, I find that the test results for parallel trends are not sensitive to the inclusion
of state-specific linear time trends. Figure 4 graphs event study coefficients for specification
controlling for linear time trends. The plots reassure that the trends are not systematically
deviating in the pre-policy period.
5.3 Robustness Checks
The main results show a strong negative effect of work requirement rules on short-run food
insecurity outcomes, decreasing the likelihood of experiencing difficulty to afford basic food
needs and lifting people out of food assistance dependency. However, estimating the average
effect for the treatment group as a whole may not uncover important differences in the
consequences of the policy across subgroups. In this section, I estimate the baseline model
for different subsamples and check whether the main findings are consistent across different
specifications.
5.3.1 Effects on Prime Age Workers and Older ABAWDs
A standard practice in policy studies is to restrict the sample to prime-age workers since
individuals aged 18-24 usually take human capital investment decisions and other life cycle
decisions (such as marriage, fertility) during this period. To address this concern, I run
the baseline regression on ABAWDs of age 25-49. Although the estimates (reported in the
second column of Table 9) for prime-age workers are slightly smaller compared to the full
sample estimates, the statistical significance and the directions of the effects echo the full
sample effects.
Next, I use the benchmark estimation structure to study the effects on ABAWDs in the
50-59 age group and summarize the result in the third column of Table 9. As I note in
footnote 1, the general SNAP work requirement applies to ABAWDs of age 50-59, but they
are not subject to the time limit which strictly targets adults in the age group 18-49. As
expected, I find no direct effect of the policy reinstatement on ABAWDs belonging to the
relatively older age group 50-59. The coefficients on SNAP benefit receipt as well as on
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food security outcomes are imprecise, statistically not significant, and smaller compared to
baseline results reported for the 18-49 age group and 25-49 age group in the first and second
column of Table 9, respectively. This analysis on the 50-59 age group serves as a placebo
test. The no treatment effect on groups that are unlikely to have received treatment lends
further credibility to my research design.
Table 9: Subsample Analysis by Age Groups
Full Sample Prime working-age, 25-49 Older, 50-59
A: SNAP Utilization
Received Food stamps -0.0125∗∗∗ -0.0097∗∗∗ 0.0012
(0.0038) (0.0032) (0.0043)
B: Food Security Outcomes
Adult, not food secure -0.0192∗∗∗ -0.0167∗∗ -0.0039
(0.0057) (0.00667) (0.0081)
Skip meals -0.0141∗∗∗ -0.0101∗∗ -0.0032
(0.0040) (0.0049) (0.0055)
Eating less -0.0104∗∗ -0.0066 -0.0044
(0.0041) (0.0046) (0.0058)
Worried about food affordability -0.0188∗∗∗ -0.0174∗∗∗ -0.0066
(0.0040) (0.0056) (0.0056)
Ran out of food or couldn’t afford more -0.0158∗∗∗ -0.0114∗∗ -0.0003
(0.0045) (0.0053) (0.0087)
Ran short of money for food -0.0143∗∗ -0.0115∗ -0.0134
(0.0057) (0.0066) (0.0085)
Received food from food bank -0.0068∗∗ -0.0056∗∗ 0.0022
(0.0029) (0.0026) (0.0045)
Observations 142,073 112,459 92,598
Demographic Controls yes yes yes
State Specific Controls yes yes yes
State FE yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
Notes: Data from the CPS-FSS, 2009-2017. Each parameter is from a separate regression. Demographic
controls include dummies for marital status, sex, education and race. State-specific time-varying con-
trols are annual state unemployment rates, political affiliation of the state governor, and state popu-
lation estimates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the state level. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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5.3.2 Heterogeneous Effects by Education
Generally, low-skilled workers are typical recipients of food assistance and other social safety
nets. (Harris, 2021) shows that the largest share of ABAWD SNAP recipients is high school
graduates (53.5 percent in 2016), and the next largest group are high school dropouts (24.6
percent in 2016) in the SNAP Quality Control data.19 I examine the impacts for “HS dropouts
and HS graduates” and for “More than HS” education groups in the second and third columns
of Table 10 respectively.
Overall, I find food security outcomes of “HS dropouts and HS graduates” are more
responsive to the policy change. They are less likely to adjust their eating behavior, such
as skipping meals. The probability of receiving emergency food from food bank, lacking
funds for food needs being stressed about food affordability decrease at a much larger rate
compared to the full sample. In contrast, for highly educated groups, the effects are much
weaker in terms of magnitude and precision.
5.3.3 Heterogeneous Effects by Marital Status
In most cases, married households have higher family income than single or never married
households as the married household may have two earning members. Families with higher
earnings are generally unlikely to be eligible for SNAP benefits. On the other hand, single
or never married ABAWDs usually rely on one earning source and have a higher chance
of depending on external food assistance. I rerun regression Eq. (1) on samples of “never
married” and “married” ABAWDs separately to rule out this contamination. The results are
summarized in the second and third columns of Table 11. As expected, I find no statistical
relationship between the food security outcomes and the work requirement policy for the
married sample. The coefficients are either wrong-signed or imprecise with sizeable stan-
dard errors. This is sort of a placebo exercise, as married ABAWDs are unlikely to have
received the treatment. For single ABAWDs, I observe much stronger effects in comparison
to estimates obtained for the full sample. As shown in Panel A of Table 11, single families
are 1.79 pp. less likely to claim food assistance. All food insecurity coefficients have nega-
tive signs indicating improvement in food security status for singles after the work rule was
reimplemented.
While interpreting these results, it is worth keeping in mind that there could be a concern
that people might select themselves into marriage in response to the policy change. To
look into this selection problem, I estimate the impact of the policy on marriage formation
and dissolution decisions by ABAWDs using data from the ACS. The outcome measures
19Quality Control (QC) data is public use microdata on SNAP recipients collected by USDA.
24
Table 10: Heterogeneous Effects, by Education
Full Sample ≤ HS > HS
A: SNAP Utilization
Received Food stamps -0.0125∗∗∗ -0.0153 -0.0104∗∗∗
(0.0038) (0.0095) (0.0037)
B: Food Security Outcomes
Adult, not food secure -0.0192∗∗∗ -0.0241∗∗ -0.0155∗∗
(0.0057) (0.0104) (0.0066)
Skip meals -0.0141∗∗∗ -0.0215∗∗ -0.0092∗∗∗
(0.0040) (0.0083) (0.0029)
Eating less -0.0104∗∗ -0.0119 -0.0088∗
(0.0041) (0.0073) (0.0044)
Worried about food affordability -0.0188∗∗∗ -0.0212∗∗∗ -0.0169∗∗∗
(0.0040) (0.0078) (0.0049)
Ran out of food or couldn’t afford more -0.0158∗∗∗ -0.0253∗∗ -0.0094∗
(0.0045) (0.0101) (0.0048)
Ran short of money for food -0.0143∗∗ -0.0212∗ -0.0096
(0.0057) (0.0121) (0.0072)
Received food from food bank -0.0068∗∗ -0.0133∗ -0.0026
(0.0029) (0.0075) (0.0021)
Observations 142,073 53,031 89,042
Demographic Controls yes yes yes
State Specific Controls yes yes yes
State FE yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
Notes: Data from the CPS-FSS, 2009-2017. Each parameter is from a separate regression. De-
mographic controls include dummies for age groups, marital status, sex and race. State-specific
time-varying controls are annual state unemployment rates, political affiliation of the state gover-
nor, and state population estimates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the
state level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
considered for this analysis are “marriage in the past 12 months” and “divorce in the past 12
months”.20 Table A.2 in Appendix A shows that there is no statistical impact on marriage
and divorce decisions of ABAWDs. For this selection exercise, another alternative is to use
the longitudinal aspect of CPS, which allows identifying individuals who got married in the
past year. However, only data for individuals who remain in the same household can be
20Data on marital status in the past 12 months are available in the ACS beginning from 2008.
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linked in this manner. Since marriage often leads to the possibility of changing households,
marriage-related attrition would bias the results.
Table 11: Heterogeneous Effects, by Marital Status
Full Sample Single Married
A: SNAP Utilization
Received Food stamps -0.0125∗∗∗ -0.0179∗∗∗ 0.0033
(0.0038) (0.0049) (0.0041)
B: Food Security Outcomes
Adult, not food secure -0.0192∗∗∗ -0.0171∗ -0.0186
(0.0057) (0.0088 ) (0.0113)
Skip meals -0.0141∗∗∗ -0.0202∗∗∗ 0.0000
(0.0040) (0.0043) (0.0069)
Eating less -0.0104∗∗ -0.0126∗∗∗ -0.0036
(0.0041) (0.0047) (0.0077)
Worried about food affordability -0.0188∗∗∗ -0.0161∗∗ -0.0197∗
(0.0040) (0.0065) (0.0117)
Ran out of food or couldn’t afford more -0.0158∗∗∗ -0.0165∗∗ -0.0121
(0.0045) (0.0069) (0.0073)
Ran short of money for food -0.0143∗∗ -0.0139∗ -0.039
(0.0057) (0.0078) (0.0097)
Received food from food bank -0.0068∗∗ -0.0087∗∗ -0.0043
(0.0029) (0.0043) (0.0037)
Observations 142,073 80,017 43,853
Demographic Controls yes yes yes
State Specific Controls yes yes yes
State FE yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes
Notes: Data from the CPS-FSS, 2009-2017. Each parameter is from a separate regression.
Demographic controls include dummies for age groups, sex, education and race. State-
specific time-varying controls are annual state unemployment rates, political affiliation of the
state governor, and state population estimates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses,
clustered at the state level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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6 Conclusion
Reestablishing work requirement rules for social safety nets programs is one of the central
topics of political battles in recent years. This paper adds to this discussion by considering
how reinstatement of SNAP work requirement rules for able bodied adults without depen-
dents affects food security outcomes in the short run. Rich information on food affordability
and food intake behavior in the Food Security Supplement of the CPS allows me to con-
tribute to the emerging literature on work requirement policies by exploiting within-state
variation in the reinstatement of the policy. Overall, I find the policy has a negative impact
on SNAP benefit claims, and ABAWDs are less likely to experience food hardships as a
result of the policy. This implies that the overreaching goal of the policy to reduce welfare
dependency was somewhat achieved. The validity of the research design is supported by
several additional results. Impacts are more substantial for less-educated groups and single
individuals, and the effects are essentially zero for placebo groups such as ABAWDs in the
50-59 age group, married ABAWDs.
The event study analysis indicates that effects are weakened around two or more years
after policy change the year of policy adoption. This raises the question about the long-
run efficacy of the policy. Due to limited data on the post-treatment period, this paper
cannot resolve this concern. As work requirement policies continue to expand for Medicaid,
it is important not only to understand the impact of such policies, but it is crucial to factor
individuals’ endogenous responses into the discussion for a comprehensive analysis. In future
studies, more insights into food consumption dynamics are required in order to understand
the optimal design of work-for-welfare policies.
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Appendix
A Evidence from the ACS
In this Appendix, I present results for selection into and out of marriage based on data from
the American Community Survey (ACS).
Table A.1: Sample selection for the analysis based on data from ACS 2009-2017
Observations
Everyone over 18 22,039,779
exclude if age > 49 11,038,818
exclude if veterans who have a service-connected disability 10,949,215
exclude if any physical or mental difficulty 10,100,645
exclude if living with minor children 5,709,650
exclude if in armed forces 5,650,951
exclude if registered in school 4,052,669
exclude if non-citizen 3,684,066
exclude if other non-relatives, institutional inmates and in foster care 3,356,405
Notes: Data from the ACS, 2009-2017. In ACS, six kinds of disabilities are reported:
cognitive difficulty, ambulatory difficulty, hearing difficulty, vision difficulty, indepen-
dent living difficulty, and self-care difficulty.
Table A.2: Impact on Marriage Formation and Dissolution
Married last year Divorced last year
Policy reimposed -0.0008 -0.0002
(0.0015) (0.0009)
Dependent Variable Mean 0.0913 0.0281
Observations 1,505,097 1,505,097
Demographic Controls yes yes
State Specific Controls yes yes
State FE yes yes
Year FE yes yes
Notes: Data from the ACS, 2009-2017. Sample of individuals age 18-49 who are not
disabled and do not live with minor children. Each parameter is from a separate regression.
Demographic controls include dummies for age groups, sex, education and race. State-
specific time-varying controls are annual state unemployment rates, political affiliation
of the state governor, and state population estimates. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses, clustered at the state level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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